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CONSTRUCTING A CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM FREE OF RACIAL BIAS: AN 
ABOLITIONIST FRAMEWORK 
Dorothy E. Roberts* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In her last speech before her death in 1965, playwright 
Lorraine Hansberry incisively described the nature of racial bias in 
America.1 She did not speak about a fairer way of punishing the 
crimes of black people; rather, she identified “the paramount crime in 
the United States” as “the refusal of its ruling classes to admit or 
acknowledge in any way the real scope and scale and character of 
their oppression of Negroes.”2 She did not describe racial bias as an 
aberration to be eliminated from the system. On the contrary, 
according to Hansberry, the oppression of black people 
. . . is not a random, helter-skelter, hit-or-miss matter of 
discrimination here and there against people who just 
happen to be of a different color. . . . It is, as that ruling 
class perfectly well knows, a highly concentrated, universal, 
and deliberate blanket of oppression pulled tightly and 
securely over 20 million citizens of this country.3 
 
 * Kirkland & Ellis Professor, Northwestern University School of Law; 
faculty fellow, Institute for Policy Research. I am grateful to the Kirkland & Ellis 
Research Fund for its financial support and to Robert Davis for excellent research 
assistance. This article is based on my talk at a symposium entitled “Pursuing 
Racial Fairness in the Administration of Justice: Twenty Years After McCleskey 
v. Kemp,” held by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund and 
Columbia Law School on Mar.2–3, 2007. 
1. Lorraine Hansberry, The Scars of the Ghetto, 16 Monthly Review 588–91 
(1965). 
2. Id. at 590. 
3. Id. at 590. 
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The blanket of oppression has grown even more suffocating 
since Hansberry spoke those words: today’s imprisonment rate is five 
times as high as in 1972 and surpasses that of all other nations.4 
Hansberry admonished her audience: “[t]his matter of 
admitting the true nature of a problem before setting about rectifying 
it, or even pretending to, is of utmost importance.”5 Before trying to 
construct a criminal justice system free of racial bias, we must first 
admit the true nature of the problem. My aim in this article is to 
honestly assess the radical changes needed to rid American criminal 
justice of racial bias rather than to propose an immediately 
attainable strategy for reform. 
The U.S criminal justice system has always functioned, in 
coordination with other institutions and social policy, to subordinate 
black people and maintain the racial caste system.6 Racial bias does 
not rest only or even primarily in the minds of those who implement 
the system; racism is engrained in the very construction of the 
system and implicated in its every aspect—how crimes are defined, 
how suspects are identified, how charging decisions are made, how 
trials are conducted, and how punishments are imposed. It would be 
hard to conjure up a mechanism that more effectively subjugates a 
group of people than state-imposed mass incarceration, capital 
punishment, and police terror, which not only confines and 
 
4. The Sentencing Project, U.S Prison Populations—Trends and 
Implications 4, http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf (last visited Sept. 
30, 2007); see also David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass 
Imprisonment, in Mass Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences 1, 1 
(David Garland ed., 2001) (hereinafter Mass Imprisonment). 
5. Hansberry, supra note 1. 
6. David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal 
Justice System (1999); see also Katheryn J. Russell, The Color of Crime (1998). 
Although the criminal justice system is biased against other peoples of color, this 
article focuses on its origins in the enslavement of Africans and its continued 
subordination of African Americans. As Andrea Smith theorizes, racism and 
white supremacy are built on the logics of genocide, supporting the expropriation 
of indigenous people’s land, and orientalism, which casts certain foreigners as a 
threat, as well as slavery. Andrea Smith, Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars 
of White Supremacy, in Color of Violence: The Incite! Anthology 66–73 (Incite! 
Women of Color Against Violence, ed., South End Press 2006). The logics of 
genocide and orientalism have legitimized state violence against Native peoples, 
Latinos, Arab Americans, and immigrants of color. As I discuss below, the logic of 
slavery has particular relevance to penal policy, capital punishment, and police 
terror. 
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disenfranchises a staggering proportion of black people, but also 
devastates the communities they come from.7 
In this Article, I present a theoretical framework aimed at 
shaking the racist foundations of the criminal justice system by 
highlighting its racial origins and antidemocratic impact. This 
framework rejects the current conceptualization of racial bias as an 
aberrational malfunction, recognizing instead how the system 
refashions past regimes of racial control to continue to sustain white 
supremacy. It supports, as a start, abolishing criminal justice 
institutions with direct lineage to slavery and Jim Crow that are key 
components of the present regime of racial repression.8 I highlight 
three key institutions—mass incarceration, capital punishment, and 
police terror—whose origins can be traced to black enslavement and 
whose modern day survival radically contradicts liberal democratic 
ideals, placing the United States outside the norm of Western 
nations. The only explanation for the endurance of these barbaric 
practices is their racist function and the only moral remedy is their 
abolition. 
Unlike state violence inflicted in the Jim Crow era explicitly 
to reinstate blacks’ slave status, today’s criminal codes and 
procedures operate under the cloak of colorblind due process. The 
racism of the criminal justice system is therefore invisible to most 
Americans, and the disproportionate involvement of blacks only 
reinforces the stereotype that they are naturally prone to crime. The 
 
7. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in 
African American Communities, 56 Stanford L. Rev. 1271 (2004). 
8. This framework is only a partial response to racism in the criminal 
justice system as it leaves intact a number of biased policies and practices, such 
as disparate charging and noncapital sentencing of violent offenders and racial 
profiling in nonviolent police stops and arrests that do not result in incarceration. 
See Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 333 (1998); 
Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows and 
Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–2000 (Univ. of Chicago, 
Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 317, 2007) reprinted in 6 Criminology 
& Public Policy 165, 165–81 (2007) (noting that misdemeanor marijuana arrests 
in New York City, which disproportionately targeted African Americans and 
Hispanics, increased by 2,670 % between 1994 and 2000 and advocating relaxing 
the legal standard for discrimination claims). Nevertheless, a successful 
abolitionist movement targeting mass imprisonment, capital punishment, and 
police terror would weaken other aspects of law enforcement that support the 
U.S. racial hierarchy, force a broad rethinking of the role of criminal justice in 
our society, and open space for envisioning more just alternatives.  
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public believes that this unprecedented level of state brutality is 
normal and necessary for its protection. A recent study by Princeton 
sociologists Devah Pager and Bruce Western found that whites just 
released from prison fared better in the New York City job market 
than blacks with identical resumes but no criminal record.9 
Employers’ preference for white offenders over law abiding blacks 
shows not only the inequitable economic conditions that squeeze 
some blacks into illegal alternatives, but also that blackness itself is 
seen as a mark of criminality. According to this view, poor blacks are 
meant to labor in prisons and not in decent jobs. 
The current McCleskey-type jurisprudence requiring proof of 
discriminatory motive or impact in individual cases treats racial bias 
as a system malfunction.10 The question posed by the justices in 
McCleskey was whether there was a discriminatory misuse of the 
death penalty—an aberrational abuse of discretion or unexplained 
discrepancy. The problem with this approach is that the massive 
criminal control of blacks is not a malfunction. It shows that the 
system is working precisely the way it was designed. Both the 
majority and dissenting justices in McCleskey v. Kemp recognized 
that racism was so endemic in the U.S. criminal justice that making 
racial discrimination unconstitutional would threaten the entire 
system.11 As Justice Brennan wrote in dissent, the reason for 
McCleskey’s holding was “a fear of too much justice.”12 
 
9. Devah Pager & Bruce Western, Race at Work: Realities of Race and 
Criminal Record in the NYC Job Market, http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/pdf/ 
race_report_web.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007). 
10. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (finding that Warren 
McCleskey failed to demonstrate that his race and that of the victim affected or 
motivated his individual death sentence and that proof that racism was endemic 
in the criminal system was not sufficient to vacate his personal sentence). 
11. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315–19, 335–42 (Brennan, dissenting); see 
James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital 
Punishment, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 83 (2007) (arguing Justice Powell’s majority 
opinion in McCleskey meant the Court’s ““‘unceasing efforts’ to eradicate racial 
prejudice in our criminal justice system” cease when necessary to let the States 
continue carrying out unavoidably race-based executions”). In announcing he 
would join Justice Powell’s opinion, Justice Scalia conceded with little concern 
that “the unconscious operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, 
including racial, upon jury decisions and (hence) prosecutorial decisions is real, 
acknowledged in the decisions of this court, and ineradicable . . . .” Memorandum 
from Justice Antonin Scalia to the Conference (Jan. 6, 1987), quoted in Liebman 
at 83 n. 424. 
12. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan,J., dissenting). 
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How do we rectify a system that so brilliantly serves its 
intended purpose? Given the function of crime control in most 
societies, as a key component of social policy aimed at governing 
marginal groups, we can expect that racial bias is inevitable as long 
as white supremacy reigns in the United States.13 
Nonetheless, anti-racist struggles have succeeded in toppling 
past regimes of racial repression in this country by exposing the 
inherent contradiction of the caste divisions these regimes reinforced 
in a formally democratic society.14 Even a system as universally 
accepted and profitable as slavery was ended in the British colonies 
and the United States as a result of slave rebellions and an 
international abolitionist movement.15 In Brown v. Board of 
Education,16 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the long-accepted 
order of “separate-but-equal” schooling when black agitation and 
international scrutiny revealed its immorality.17 Indeed, the 
escalation of African-American imprisonment in the last thirty years 
can be seen as a backlash against the collapse of de jure segregation 
under pressure from the civil rights movement. There is precedent 
for the success of a model for contesting racism in the criminal justice 
system that exposes how the system continues to preserve the U.S. 
racial hierarchy by denying blacks’ citizenship rights. The United 
States is an exception among the world’s democracies in its 
acceptance of mass imprisonment, capital punishment, and police 
terror.18 These law enforcement policies have reached a state of such 
 
13. See Katherine Beckett & Bruce Western, Governing Social Marginality: 
Welfare, Incarceration, and The Transformation of State Policy, in Mass 
Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 35; see generally David Garland, Punishment and 
Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory (1990); Georg Rusche & Otto 
Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure (1939) (evidence and argument 
that policy regimes in the United States differ, but all act in some way to exclude 
marginal groups). 
14. Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and 
Mesh, in Mass Imprisonment, supra note 5, at 82, 86. 
15. Eugene D. Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American 
Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World (1980); Adam Hochschild, Bury 
the Chains: Prophets and Rebels in the Fight to Free an Empire’s Slaves (2006). 
16. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
17. Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American 
Democracy (2002). 
18. Marie Gottschalk, The Prison and the Gallows: The Politics of Mass 
Incarceration in America (2006); see also Marc Mauer, Comparative International 
Rates of Incarceration: An Examination of Causes and Trends 2 (2003), available 
at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/pub9036.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2007). 
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glaring opposition to democratic ideals that the time is ripe for a new 
movement to abolish them. 
History, social science, and political theory are more useful to 
this model than current legal doctrine on racial bias developed 
largely to legitimize racist institutions. Social science research on the 
community-level disenfranchisement and social damage caused by 
the concentration of mass imprisonment in black neighborhoods, for 
example, reveals a profound contradiction between asserted ideals of 
participatory, liberal democracy and the prison apparatus.19 The 
criminal justice system’s racial bias functions to deny blacks’ 
citizenship rights in two principal ways. First, criminal justice 
supervision of a large proportion of black people interferes with their 
participation in democracy by isolating them in prisons, denying 
them the right to vote, and damaging broader social and political 
relationships necessary for collective action.20 Second, the system 
reinforces the myth of blacks’ propensity for criminality, which has 
been invoked throughout U.S. history as “evidence that blacks were 
unworthy of assuming the full rights and duties of citizenship.”21 An 
interdisciplinary approach can help to inform an alternative legal 
doctrine that accounts for the repressive function and impact of 
criminal justice policy. 
Part II of this article describes the historical roots of penal 
policy, capital punishment, and police terror in slavery and Jim 
Crow; Part III discusses their antidemocratic function; and Part IV 




According to Mauer, the United States has the highest incarceration rate in the 
world, “5-8 times that of the industrialized nations to which we are most similar, 
Canada and Western Europe.” 
19. Roberts, supra note 7, at 1294–97. 
20. See sources discussed in id. at 1281–97; see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, On 
the Courthouse Lawn: Confronting the Legacy of Lynching in the 21st Century 
(2007) (giving a wide range of evidence showing the marginalization of prisoners 
and their families, and the effects thereof). 
21. Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon 
Disenfranchisement and American Democracy 41 (2006). 
ROBERTS FINAL  
2007] AN ABOLITIONIST FRAMEWORK 267 
II. THE SYSTEM’S HISTORICAL ROOTS IN SLAVERY AND JIM CROW  
The pillars of the U.S. criminal justice system—mass 
imprisonment, capital punishment, and police terror—can all be 
traced to the enslavement of Africans. The criminal justice system 
functioned as a means of legally restricting the freedoms of black 
people after their emancipation and preserving whites’ superior 
status. Through these institutions, law enforcement continues to 
implement the “logic of slavery,” which treats black people as 
inherently “slaveable.”22 White slaveholders classified Africans as an 
animal-like race, separate and inferior to whites, who could be legally 
treated as chattel property. These slaveholders believed blacks 
demonstrated their proximity to animals by their lack of “intellect, 
culture, and civilization” and their natural propensity to commit 
crime.23 Prisons, state executions, and police brutality have 
supported white supremacy by effectively reinstating blacks’ slave 
status and by reinforcing the myth of inherent black criminality. 
A. Mass Incarceration 
Penal institutions have historically been key components of 
social policy aimed at governing marginal social groups. Sociologist 
Loïc Wacquant theorizes about prisons as instruments of 
management of social marginality and examines their particular role 
in U.S. racial repression.24 He situates contemporary mass 
incarceration in a historical lineage of “peculiar institutions” that 
have served to define, confine, and control African Americans—
slavery (1619-1865), the Jim Crow system in the South (1865-1965), 
the urban ghetto in the North (1915-1968), and the “novel 
organizational compound formed by the vestiges of the ghetto and 
the expanding carceral system [(1968– present)].”25 
Mass imprisonment is not only an institution that acts like 
prior oppressive regimes. Today’s penal policy has a direct lineage to 
 
22. Smith, supra note 6, at 67. 
23. Patricia Hill Collins, Black Sexual Politics: African Americans, Gender, 
and the New Racism 100 (2004). 
24. Wacquant, supra note 14, at 82. 
25. Id. at 85. 
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the regimes of slavery and Jim Crow.26 When black people were 
enslaved in the United States, the state incarcerated white people 
almost exclusively. Emancipation and the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which prohibited involuntary servitude except upon 
criminal conviction, dramatically changed the demographics of 
prisons. Incarceration and the convict leasing system became a 
principal means of preserving blacks’ status as the property of 
whites. “In Alabama, for example, nonwhites made up just two 
percent of the prison population in 1850, but seventy-four percent by 
1870.”27 Southern prisons both extracted the labor of formerly 
enslaved blacks and helped to keep them economically and politically 
inferior to whites. Some state prisons literally took over plantations, 
effectively re-enslaving black inmates who were whipped and worked 
to death in chain gangs.28 
Those confined in U.S. prisons today are disproportionately 
the descendants of slaves. The transformation of prison policy over 
the last thirty years has produced the mass incarceration of African 
Americans.29 The sheer scale and acceleration of U.S. prison growth 
“is an unprecedented event in the history of the U.S. and, more 
generally, in the history of liberal democracy.”30 This extraordinary 
prison expansion involved incarceration of young black men in 
grossly disproportionate numbers. The gap between black and white 
incarceration rates has deepened along with rising inmate 
numbers.31 Most people sentenced to prison today are black.32 On any 
 
26. See Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? 22–39 (2003) (explaining 
the relationship between “historical expressions of racism” and the structure of 
current prison systems in the United States). 
27. Manza & Uggen, supra note 21, at 57. 
28. David M. Oshinsky, Worse Than Slavery: Parchman Farm and the 
Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice 34–45 (1997). 
29. See generally Mark Mauer, Race to Incarcerate (1999) (detailing the 
expansion of the American prison population over three decades, starting in the 
1970s, and examining several aspects of prison policy that have specifically 
affected rates of African-American incarceration); Michael Tonry, Malign Neglect: 
Race, Crime, and Punishment (1995) (describing the rise in the numbers of young 
minority citizens, especially males, incarcerated during the 1980s and early 
1990’s and accounting for the causes of this increase). 
30. Mass Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 1. By the end of 2002, the number 
of inmates in the nation’s jails and prisons exceeded two million. 
31. Marc Mauer, Racial Disparities in Prison Getting Worse in the 1990s, 
8 Overcrowded Times 8 (1997). 
32. See Human Rights Watch, Incarcerated America, Backgrounders, 
http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/incarceration/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) 
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given day, nearly one-third of black men in their twenties are under 
the supervision of the criminal justice system—either behind bars, on 
probation, or on parole.33 More than half of black male teenagers in 
some inner-city high schools are arrested each year.34 As a result, a 
black male child has a one in three chance of going to prison during 
his lifetime and the likelihood is even higher in some cities.35 
Radical changes in crime control and sentencing policies, 
rather than increasing crime rates, led to the prison explosion.36 The 
growth of both the prison population and its racial disparity are 
significantly attributable to aggressive street-level enforcement of 
drug laws and harsh sentencing of drug offenders.37 An increasingly 
large proportion of new admissions for drug offenses combined with 
longer mandatory sentences kept prison populations at historically 
high levels during the 1990s, despite declines in crime.38 Although 
whites have a higher rate of illegal drug use, black offenders are 
 
(describing the disproportionate number of blacks in prison, as of 2003. In 2003, 
44 % of all prisoners in the U.S. were African American). See also U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Prison Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2007) (explaining that at the end of 
2005, there were more black male sentenced prison inmates than white or Latino 
male inmates). 
33. Marc Mauer et al., The Sentencing Project: Young Black Americans 
and the Criminal Justice System: Five Years Later 1 (1995). 
34. Paul Hirschfield, The Hyper-Concentration of Juvenile Justice Contact 
among Urban African American Males and the Consequences of Collective 
Labeling (paper presented at 2007 American Sociological Association Annual 
Meeting, on file with author). 
35. Donald Braman, Families and Incarceration, in Marc Mauer & 
Chesney-Lind, ed., Invisible Punishment: The Collateral Consequences of Mass 
Imprisonment, supra note 4 at 117 (2002). 
36. Bruce Western, Punishment and Inequality in America (2006); Marc 
Mauer, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States, in 
Mass Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 6; see also Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 8 
(finding no evidence that New York City’s marijuana policing strategy is 
associated with reductions in violent or property crimes in the city). 
37. William Chambliss, Drug War Politics: Racism, Corruption, and 
Alienation, in Crime Control and Social Justice: The Delicate Balance 295, 297–
99 (Darnell F. Hawkins et al. eds., 2003); Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan 
Holland, Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City 
Neighborhoods (2003), Paper No. 03–54, Columbia Law School Public Law & 
Legal Theory Working Paper Group, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=392120 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2007), at 5. 
38. Western, supra note 9; Ernest Drucker, Population Impact of Mass 
Incarceration Under New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws: An Analysis of Years of 
Life Lost, 79 J. Urb. Health 434, 434–35 (2002). 
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much more likely to be sentenced to prison.39 The sentencing rate for 
drug offenses in 1998 was twelve times greater for black offenders 
than for white offenders.40 
The sentencing changes responsible for the prison explosion 
made punishment less individualized.41 Sentencing reforms have 
increased both the certainty and severity of sanctions involving 
incarceration.42 In 2000, sixty-five percent of felons were sentenced to 
some form of incarceration.43 As Marc Mauer observes in explaining 
prison growth, “[t]he most significant change within the criminal 
justice system is the loss of the individual in the sentencing process, 
as determinate sentencing and other ‘reforms’ have taken us from an 
offender-based to an offense-based system.”44 Although some 
reformers in the 1970s advocated determinate schemes to reduce 
judicial bias and unfair disparities in sentencing,45 the severity of 
mandatory sentences combined with the War on Drugs and 
 
39. Chambliss, supra note 37, 299 fig.12.5. 
40. Id. at 301 fig.12.5. 
41. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal 
Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts about the 
Next, 70 U. Chi L. Rev. 1, 12 (2003) (discussing a “new penology in sentencing 
guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences that allocate punishment 
wholesale rather than retail”); see also Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-
Well to the Criminal History Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in 
Criminal Law, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 99, 101–02 (describing the 
development and refinement of an actuarial approach to criminal law). 
42. Todd R. Clear & Dina R. Rose, Individual Sentencing Practices and 
Aggregate Social Problems, in Crime Control and Social Justice: The Delicate 
Balance, supra note 37, at 27. In commuting I. Lewis Libby Jr.’s 30-month prison 
sentence in July 2007, President George Bush acknowledged the excessiveness of 
federal sentencing. See Adam Liptak, Bush Rationale on Libby Stirs Legal 
Debate, N.Y. Times, July 4, 2007, at A1. University of Houston law professor 
David Dow, who represented several death row inmates denied commutation by 
then-Governor Bush, poignantly highlights the injustice of President Bush’s 
action: “Because President Bush signed a commutation, a rich and powerful man 
will spend not a day in prison, while 57 poor and poorly connected human beings 
died because Governor Bush refused to lift a pen for them.” David R. Dow, To the 
Editor, N.Y. Times, July 4, 2007, at A16. 
43. Todd R. Clear & Dina R. Rose, supra note 42, at 27. 
44. Marc Mauer, The Causes and Consequences of Prison Growth in the 
United States, in Mass Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 12. 
45. See, e.g., Marvin Frankel, Criminal Sentencing: Law Without Order 
(1973). 
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discriminatory enforcement of offenses led to unprecedented racial 
inequity in the prison population.46 
Moreover, institutional arrangements that reward the 
fanatical pursuit of convictions encourage prosecutorial 
“overreaching.”47 By routinely indicting defendants on the maximum 
charges possible, prosecutors place overwhelming pressure on 
defendants to give up their right to trial.48 There is virtual uniformity 
of plea bargaining in drug cases.49 In New York, for example, more 
than ninety percent of drug cases are decided by guilty pleas, rather 
than jury trials.50 Mandatory minimum sentencing laws pressure 
defendants to cooperate with prosecutors as the only way to escape 
draconian prison terms.51 This “assembly-line justice” created by 
mandatory sentencing and prosecutorial power funnel black 
defendants into prison without the individualized judgment of 
culpability normally contemplated by notions of just desert.52 Thus, 
the mass imprisonment of African Americans should be viewed as a 
state measure to supervise citizens en masse on the basis of race 
rather than a race-neutral effort to control crime or mete out 
offenders’ just deserts. 
 
46. David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in 
Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts 44 J.L. & Econ. 285 (2001) 
(finding, after controlling for extensive criminological, demographic, and 
socioeconomic variables, that blacks, males, and offenders with low levels of 
education and income receive substantially longer federal sentences). 
47. Robert Owen, Absolute Power, Absolute Corruption, in Prison Nation: 
The Warehousing of America’s Poor 23 (Tara Herival & Paul Wright eds. 2003); 
see also Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American 
Prosecutor (2007) (describing the injustice created by prosecutors’ unbridled 
charging and plea bargaining decisions). 
48. Owen, supra note 47, at 17. 
49. Angela J. Davis, Incarceration and Imbalance of Power, in Invisible 
Punishment: The Collateral Consequences of Mass Imprisonment 61, 78 (Marc 
Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002). 
50. James Fellner, Human Rights Watch, Cruel and Usual: 
Disproportionate Sentences for New York Drug Offenders (1997), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/usny. 
51. Owen, supra note 47, at 26. 
52. Angela J. Davis, Incarceration and the Imbalance of Power, in Invisible 
Punishment, supra note 49, at 78 (“[a]ssembly-line justice facilitated by powerful 
prosecutors, helpless defense attorneys, and increasingly powerless judges now 
characterizes the system that determines whether a person will lose his liberty or 
even his life.”). 
ROBRTS FINAL  
272 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [39:261 
The escalation in imprisonment of African Americans at the 
end of the 20th century is a political reflection of its start a century 
earlier. Similar to the growth of black incarceration after 
Emancipation, its contemporary surge is a response to the gains of 
the civil rights movement. As Alex Lichtenstein points out, 
[s]table incarceration rates appear in a period of white 
racial hegemony and a stable racial order, such as that 
secured by slavery in the first half of the 19th century or 
Jim Crow during the first half of the 20th. Correspondingly, 
sudden rises in incarceration, especially of minorities, tend 
to appear one generation after this racial hegemony has 
been cracked, as in the first and second Reconstructions of 
emancipation and civil rights.53 
Thus, the shift in law enforcement policies at the end of the 
1970s that started the astronomical U.S. prison expansion can be 
seen as a backlash against the reforms achieved by civil rights 
struggles.54 It is time for a third Reconstruction ushered in by a 
movement that cracks the racial order reinforced by the mass 
imprisonment of African Americans. 
B. Capital Punishment 
Like mass incarceration, capital punishment in the United 
States is also intimately tied to the enslavement of black people and 
the preservation of white supremacy. The death penalty can be 
traced to the harsh punishment of African slaves, followed by state-
sanctioned lynchings after their emancipation from slavery.55 
Historically, race-based criminal codes imposed the death penalty on 
slaves for many more crimes than whites. Blacks were commonly 
hanged for rape, slave revolt, burglary, and arson.56 Moreover, slaves 
 
53. Alex Lichtenstein, The Private and the Public in Penal History: A 
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54. See Loïc Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the 
“Race Question” in the US, 13 New Left Review 41, 52 (2002) (linking the 1970s 
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55. Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime And Law (1997); Stuart Banner, The 
Death Penalty: An American History (2003). 
56. Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in 
Historical Perspective, in From Lynch Mobs to the Killing State: Race and the 
Death Penalty in America, 96, 98–99 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat, 
ROBERTS FINAL  
2007] AN ABOLITIONIST FRAMEWORK 273 
were subjected to a fate worse than death, what Stuart Banner calls 
“super capital punishment”—the execution of a condemned slave was 
often made especially painful and degrading by burning him alive at 
the stake, displaying his severed head on a pole in front of the court 
house, or allowing his corpse to decompose in public view.57 
After Emancipation, Southerners instituted the ritual 
kidnapping and killing of blacks in highly publicized ceremonies to 
re-establish white rule. In the introduction to their book, From Lynch 
Mobs to the Killing State, editors Charles Ogletree, Jr. and Austin 
Sarat observe that “saying that there is a long and deep connection 
between this country’s racial politics and its uses of the killings of 
African Americans through lynchings and the death penalty will 
come as a surprise to few.”58 By leaving disfigured black bodies 
hanging like “strange fruit” from tree limbs, lynch mobs reinstated 
the white power structure threatened by blacks’ freedom. 
Spectacle lynchings proclaimed the futility of the freedmen’s 
new civil rights, literally reinstating black bodies as the property of 
whites that could be chopped to pieces for their entertainment.59 The 
tortured black body displayed for public consumption affirmed the 
dominance of whites and exclusion of blacks from citizenship, and it 
served as a warning to anyone who defied this racial order.60 As 
sociologist David Garland points out, the hundreds of “public torture 
lynchings” celebrated until almost 1940 contradict the scholarly 
narrative about the civilizing evolution of punishments in modern 
western nations.61 Southern whites revived archaic forms of 
execution involving torture, burning, and mutilation to show that 
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57. Banner, supra note 55, at 104–05. 
58. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat, Introduction in From Lynch 
Mobs to the Killing State, supra note 56, at 1. 
59. Ifill, supra note 20; David Garland, Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: 
Public Torture Lynchings in Twentieth Century America, 39 Law & Soc’y Rev. 
793, 823 (2005); Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment as Legal 
Lynching in From Lynch Mobs to the Killing State, supra note 56, at 21–30. 
60. Ifill, supra note 20; Garland, supra note 59, at 815–17; Kaufman-
Osborn, supra note 59; Jerome H. Skolnick, American Interrogation: From 
Torture to Trickery, in Torture: A Collection, 105, 106 (Sanford Levinson, ed. 
2004). 
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regular justice was too dignified for black offenders.62 The public 
torture of blacks accused of offending the racial order demonstrated 
whites’ unlimited power and blacks’ utter worthlessness. This 
nation’s rights, liberties, and justice were meant for white people 
only; blacks meant nothing before the law. 
Lynchings were not exceptions to the law; they were 
extensions of the inequitable formal administration of justice and 
part of a broader system of racial control. Garland emphasizes that 
public torture lynchings were treated like a “legitimate expression of 
community justice[:]”63 they were staged public penalties imposed in 
response to allegations of serious crimes; they were conducted by 
respectable members of the white community, including local law 
officers; and they were approved by community leaders and state 
officials.64 Lynchings were the terrorist counterpart to state-
supported debt peonage, disenfranchisement, and segregation laws 
that kept blacks subservient to whites.65 
As lynchings subsided, they were replaced by the imposition 
of capital punishment disproportionately on blacks. In the twentieth 
century, public hangings in some Southern states were reserved for 
black men convicted of raping white women. Kentucky reinstituted 
public hangings for rape in 1920, and in 1938 became the last state to 
abolish public execution.66 Executions of blacks used to mimic 
lynchings as closely as possible.67 Willie McGee was executed on May 
8, 1951, based on circumstantial evidence that he had raped a white 
woman, despite his lawyers’ argument to the Mississippi Supreme 
Court that no white man had ever been put to death for rape in that 
state.68 Five hundred people gathered on the lawn of the Jones 
County Courthouse, where McGee was electrocuted using a portable 
electric chair that traveled from community to community. According 
 
62. Id. at 814. 
63. Garland, supra note 59, at 810. 
64. Garland, supra note 59, at 797–98. 
65. Id. at 810. Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 59, at 33 (stating that 
lynchings “should be located not in the domain of the illegal or the extralegal but, 
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that vested informal police powers in members of the white race and that 
encouraged vigilantism as a necessary complement to its weak agencies of 
formally authorized political discipline”). 
66. Banner, supra note 55, at 106. 
67. Ifill, supra note 20. 
68. Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 59, at 40. 
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to one account, “[o]ut on the lawn, when the portable generator 
stopped humming, indicating that the electrocution had taken place, 
the crowd burst into cheers, then crushed forward in an effort to 
glimpse the corpse as it was removed from the building.”69 
Scholars have noted that as racial inequality became more 
institutionalized, it was less imperative to enforce white dominance 
through “more graphic forms of racial violence.”70 Jacquelyn Hall 
notes that lynching receded as legal institutions were developed to 
deny blacks “the opportunity to own land, the right to vote, access to 
education, and participation in the administration of justice.” 71 “Once 
a new system of disenfranchisement, debt peonage, and segregation 
were firmly in place,” she writes, “mob violence gradually declined.”72 
Thus, like the shift from enslavement to mass incarceration, the shift 
from mob infliction of racial violence to capital punishment 
institutionalized racial repression in a supposedly race-neutral 
criminal justice system. There was a smooth transition from lynching 
to state execution because “a culture that carried out so much public 
unofficial capital punishment could hardly grow squeamish about the 
official variety.”73 Today, states attempt to sanitize capital 
punishment by utilizing lethal injection, a method of killing 
associated less with lynching than electrocution and hanging.74 
Nevertheless, states continue to impose the death penalty on the 
basis of race.75 
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C. Police Terror 
The roots of coercive police interrogation techniques, known 
as the third degree, can also be traced to lynching.76 The first stage of 
lynching was often to extract a confession by whipping or burning the 
accused. Prior to Miranda v. Arizona,77 which famously upheld 
suspects’ right to remain silent, police in the segregated South 
routinely used torture to force blacks to confess to crimes.78 Jerome 
Skolnick shows that public torture lynchings, typically carried out 
with the participation or sanction of the police, led directly to police 
whippings of black suspects to obtain a confession.79 The 1936 
Supreme Court case Brown v. Mississippi involved the convictions of 
three black tenant farmers for murdering a white planter based 
solely on their confessions.80 When one of the defendants, Ellington, 
denied committing the crime, the deputy sheriff and his posse 
hanged him from a tree, and when he continued to profess his 
innocence, tied him to a tree and whipped him. Over the course of 
several days, Ellington was brutally whipped until he confessed to a 
statement dictated by the deputy. “The record of the testimony shows 
that the signs of the rope on his neck were plainly visible during the 
so-called trial,” the Supreme Court opinion notes.81 
After coerced confessions were deemed inadmissible in 
criminal trials, Skolnick argues, police detectives continued to use 
the third degree and “used [it] against suspects irrespective of race.”82 
In the post-Miranda era, according to Skolnick, police rely on 
deception and trickery, not physical brutality, to obtain evidence for 
trial. I would argue, however, that race is still implicated in patterns 
 
76. Skolnick, supra note 60. See also John H. Blume et al., Education and 
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of police terror.83 Police inflict violence, whether the beating, killing, 
or torture of unarmed suspects, most frequently and most recklessly 
on blacks.84 Nearly all the people in Los Angeles mauled by police 
dogs are black or Latino.85 As one Philadelphia officer put it, the first 
rule of police abuse is “keep it in the ghetto.”86 The publicized street 
beating of Rodney King, the sodomizing of Abner Louima in a 
stationhouse bathroom, and the killings of Amadou Diallo (by forty-
one police bullets) and Sean Bell (by fifty police bullets) are called 
aberrational by police spokesmen but, in fact, illustrate more 
widespread police brutality and harassment in black neighborhoods. 
Police torture of suspects continues to be a tolerated means of 
confirming the presumed criminality of blacks. White police officers 
in the Area Two Violent Crimes Unit on the South Side of Chicago 
carried on a reign of torture against black residents for two decades 
beginning in the early 1970s.87 Led by Lieutenant Jon Burge, officers 
coerced dozens of confessions by punching and kicking suspects, 
burning them with radiators and cigarettes, putting guns in their 
mouths, placing plastic bags over their heads, and delivering electric 
shocks to their ears, nose, fingers, and genitals.88 
Is Burge the proverbial rotten apple whose excesses do not 
reflect upon the entire police force? Burge’s torture campaign was 
well-known and countenanced by other police officers, the state’s 
attorney’s office, judges, and doctors at Cook County Hospital.89 
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Complaints describing similar acts of torture were filed with 
administrative agencies, the mayor, the state’s attorney, and the U.S. 
Attorney, and alleged by victims at their criminal trials.90 Yet all 
ignored the evidence of torture. The Office of Professional Standards 
did not investigate the complaints until 1990, following a damning 
Amnesty International report, and the city suppressed its report 
finding systematic torture in Area Two until 1992.91 Burge was 
eventually fired in 1993, retiring with a pension to Florida, but 
criminal charges were never brought against him or any other Area 
Two officer.92 
Like lynchings and police whippings, contemporary police 
brutality is not an exception to the law. Current legal doctrine 
condones police brutality and makes individual acts of abuse appear 
isolated, aberrational, and acceptable rather than part of a 
systematic pattern of official violence.93 Legal rules fragment 
instances of police brutality so as to obscure its systemic nature, 
while police supervisors, prosecutors and judges routinely turn a 
blind eye to its occurrence. Legal scholar Susan Bandes catalogues 
the innumerable legal hurdles to identifying and documenting 
patterns of police brutality: “[c]omplaints are discouraged, 
confessions are not videotaped, record keeping is lax or nonexistent, 
records are sealed or expunged, patterns are not tracked, and police 
files are deemed undiscoverable.”94 The additional barriers that 
prevent victims from obtaining relief in court are equally onerous. 
According to Bandes, they include: 
[E]videntiary rulings, protective orders, judicial toleration 
of police perjury or of “the blue wall of silence,” assumptions 
of credibility that favor police officers, the absolute 
immunity of testifying officers, substantive constitutional 
doctrine insulating failures to act or demanding an 
exceptionally high level of proof of wrongdoing, restrictive 
municipal liability standards coupled with a lack of 
receptivity to evidence of systemic wrongdoing, and 
standing doctrines.95 
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The chain of racialized terror that spanned slavery, lynching, 
and police whippings remains unbroken as brutalization of blacks is 
routinely practiced in today’s criminal justice system. 
III. THE SYSTEM’S ANTI-DEMOCRATIC FUNCTION 
Poor African-American communities have felt the brunt of 
the staggering build-up of the prison population over the last thirty 
years. The most obvious way in which mass incarceration bars black 
democratic participation is the impact of felon disenfranchisement. 
The United States is exceptional not only because of the astronomical 
rate of incarceration within its borders, but also because of the 
antidemocratic impact of incarceration. Jeff Manza and Christopher 
Uggen definitively demonstrate the tie between incarceration and the 
disenfranchisement of African Americans.96 States passed the first 
felon disenfranchisement laws during the nineteenth century in 
response to the extension of suffrage to property-less white men 
while blacks were still denied the right to vote. After the Civil War, 
Southern states revised their disenfranchisement laws to prevent 
African Americans from voting by tying the loss of voting rights to 
offenses almost exclusively applied to blacks while excluding even 
more serious crimes of which whites were commonly convicted.97 
Some states disqualified thieves, burglars, adulterers, and wife 
beaters, but not those who committed murder. Until the late 1960s, 
when it barred all felons from voting, Mississippi permitted many 
violent felons to vote while disenfranchising less serious offenders.98 
In addition, states that previously had no disenfranchisement laws 
passed them. The post-Civil War expansion of felon 
disenfranchisement corresponded to the rapid shift in prison 
populations from predominantly white to nonwhite prisoners. 
Manza and Uggen estimate that on Election Day in 
November 2004, 5.3 million Americans were prevented from voting 
because of a criminal conviction.99 This massive citizen 
disenfranchisement has the greatest impact on African American 
 
abuse. Libby Sander, Chicago Revamps Investigation of Police Abuse, but Privacy 
Fight Continues, N.Y. Times, July 20, 2007, at A14.  
96. Manza & Uggen, supra note 21. 
97. Id. at 42–43. 
98. Id. at 42. 
99. Id. at 76. 
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men. Manza and Uggen determine that “in fourteen states, more 
than one in ten African Americans have lost the right to vote by 
virtue of a felony conviction, and five of these states disqualify over 
twenty percent of the African American voting age population.”100 
As Manza and Uggen point out, “the United States is the only 
country in the democratic world that systematically disenfranchises 
large numbers of non-incarcerated offenders (i.e., those who are 
either on probation or parole, or have finished their sentence).”101 
Barring such a large percentage of citizens from voting “represents a 
failure to make good on the promise of universal suffrage.”102 The 
practice of attaching formal disenfranchisement to a criminal 
conviction, and thereby denying the vote to large numbers of African 
Americans, reduces the threat to both the political and economic 
power of whites.103 
Mass incarceration excludes African Americans from full 
citizenship in a less direct but equally devastating way. Studies in 
several cities reveal that the exit and reentry of inmates is 
geographically concentrated in the poorest minority neighborhoods.104 
Social science research on prisons’ community-level consequences 
demonstrates how the concentration of incarceration within inner-
city neighborhoods excludes African Americans from social 
citizenship. A host of empirical studies conducted in the last decade 
conclude that incarceration has become a systematic aspect of 
community members’ family affairs, economic prospects, political 
engagement, social norms, and childhood expectations for the 
future.105 As I summarized elsewhere, “[t]hree main theories explain 
the social mechanisms through which mass incarceration harms the 
African-American communities where it is concentrated: mass 
imprisonment damages social networks, distorts social norms, and 
destroys social citizenship.”106 
 
100. Id. at 79. 
101. Id. at 38. 
102. Id. at 8. 
103. Id. at 61. 
104. Todd R. Clear et al., Coercive Mobility and Crime: A Preliminary 
Examination of Concentrated Incarceration and Social Disorganization, 20 Just. 
Q. 33 (2003); Fagan et al., supra note 37, at 14. 
105. Fagan et al., supra note 37, at 3–4. 
106. Roberts, supra note 7, at 1281. 
ROBERTS FINAL  
2007] AN ABOLITIONIST FRAMEWORK 281 
Structural racism systematically maintains racial hierarchies 
established in prior eras by embedding white privilege and nonwhite 
disadvantage in policies, institutions, and cultural representation.107 
Mass incarceration is perhaps the most effective institution to 
inscribe these barriers in contemporary community life and transfer 
racial disadvantage to the next generation.108 One of its most 
pernicious features is its destruction of community-based resources 
for contesting prison policy and other systemic forms of 
disenfranchisement by breaking down social networks and norms 
needed for political solidarity and activism.109 
While prison policy disenfranchises African Americans in 
direct and concrete ways, capital punishment more symbolically 
reinforces white rule. A legacy of lynching is reflected in the racially 
disparate imposition of the death penalty, which sustains white 
supremacy. The ritualistic torture that accompanied executions was 
reserved only for black victims of lynching because it constituted a 
political message about race.110 Torture lynchings punished crimes 
perceived to violate the most imperative racial codes—murdering a 
white employer, sheriff, or public official or raping a white woman.111 
Today, capital punishment is similarly imposed according to the race 
of the victim: killing a white person dramatically increases the 
chances of being executed, especially when the defendant is black.112 
As the Supreme Court noted, “black defendants, such as McCleskey, 
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who kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the 
death penalty.”113 
Courts have tolerated an astounding amount of blatant racial 
prejudice on the part of white prosecutors, judges, jurors, and defense 
counsel in death penalty cases. In one case, jurors admitted using 
racial slurs during their deliberations and the defendant’s 
unprepared court-appointed lawyer opined that blacks make good 
basketball players but not teachers.114 Studies show that jurors are 
less empathetic toward black defendants, especially if the victim is 
white.115 Police also investigate these crimes more aggressively and 
prosecutors are more likely to seek the death penalty in these 
cases.116 Blacks are excluded from juries and are less likely to be 
represented among prosecutors and judges who make critical 
decisions leading to death sentences. Thus, there is ample evidence of 
conscious and unconscious racial bias at every phase of capital 
punishment; this bias helps the institution serve its historic function 
of preserving the racial order. 
Police terror also reinforces white rule, as well as the myth 
that blacks are naturally prone to crime. The sheriff’s deputy in 
Brown v. Mississippi saw no need to deny that he had presided over 
the torture of the black suspects. Rather, he testified that the 
whipping was “not too much for a Negro.”117 This might explain why 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld the trial court’s admission 
of the tainted confessions into evidence: whipping was not considered 
an excessive interrogation technique when imposed on black people. 
It now seems preposterous that the Mississippi judge believed that 
the black farmers’ words were true confessions. Clearly the 
whippings they endured had everything to do with enforcing white 
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power and nothing to do with eliciting information about their 
alleged crime. 
The physical imposition of inferior status makes police terror 
a particularly effective technology for enforcing the racial order: race 
is a system of governance that classifies human beings into a political 
hierarchy based on invented biological demarcations.118 The state-
sanctioned torture of both foreign detainees to support U.S. 
imperialism abroad and black people to preserve white supremacy at 
home validates the biopolitical logic of race.119 Similarly, the 
contemporary legal edifice erected by the Bush Administration to 
shield torture has direct antecedents in the colonial and neocolonial 
jurisprudence that justified the uncivilized treatment of African and 
Asian natives under the racialized theory of savage war. The 
rationale for torture grounded in the victims’ savage nature is 
validated by the act of torture itself. Torture transforms its victims 
rather than the perpetrators into criminals and terrorists. As Liz 
Philipose observes, “[d]espite clear evidence of abuse inflicted by 
whites, ‘terror’ becomes a racial marker reserved for blacks, 
dissidents, minorities, and Muslims.”120 Positioning racialized 
captives in total subjection makes the torturer appear to be 
defending civilization, law, and order, while the injured captive 
becomes the wrongdoer deserving of punishment. The systematic 
police brutality inflicted on blacks today similarly validates the belief 
in blacks’ dangerous propensities while keeping blacks “in their 
place.” 
IV. AN ABOLITIONIST APPROACH 
Mass imprisonment, capital punishment, and police terror 
are not universally associated with racial subjugation. But these 
barbaric practices can be traced to the enslavement of Africans in the 
United States and their endurance in modern America serves to 
sustain the racial order. Racism explains what would otherwise be an 
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intolerable contradiction of their existence in an enlightened 
democracy. If we see capital punishment, mass incarceration, and 
police terror as modern extensions of a caste system that originated 
in slavery and that continues to subjugate black people, eliminating 
racial bias from the criminal justice system requires their abolition. 
Conversely, efforts to abolish these institutions should place their 
racist function at the center of their advocacy. 
The goals of an abolitionist movement would be: to drastically 
reduce the prison population by seeking state and federal 
moratoriums on new prison constructions, amnesty for most 
prisoners convicted of nonviolent crimes, and repeal of excessive, 
mandatory sentences for drug offenses;121 to abolish capital 
punishment; and to implement new procedures to identify and 
punish patterns of police abuse. 
I distinguish my abolitionist approach from the one described 
by Austin Sarat that “argue[s] against the death penalty not by 
claiming that it is immoral or cruel but by pointing out that it has 
not been, and cannot be, administered in a manner that is compatible 
with our legal system’s fundamental commitments to fair and equal 
treatment.”122 According to Sarat, these abolitionists see the linkage 
of race and capital punishment “through the lens of 
discrimination.”123 My claim against mass incarceration, capital 
punishment, and police terror is not that they are imposed in a 
discriminatory fashion. Rather, I argue that these immoral practices 
have flourished in the United States in order to impose a racist order. 
Understanding their racial origins and function helps to explain their 
endurance and the need to abolish them.124 
 
121. See Paul Street, Color Bind: Prisons and the New American Racism, 
in Prison Nation, supra note 47 at 30, 38; see also Paul Butler, Racially Based 
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System 105 Yale L.J. 677, 
715 (1995) (arguing, based on the doctrine of jury nullification, that black jurors 
should decline to convict black defendants charged with nonviolent drug 
offenses). 
122. Austin Sarat, The Rhetoric of Race in the “New Abolitionism,” in From 
Lynch Mobs to the Killing State, supra note 56, at 263, 260–84. 
123. Id. at 264. 
124. See generally Angela Y. Davis, Abolition Democracy: Beyond Empire, 
Prisons and Torture (2005) (discussing U.S. prison regimes and their 
antidemocratic function). For example, Critical Resistance is a national 
organization based in Oakland, California, “committed to ending society’s use of 
prisons and policing as a solution to society’s problems.” Critical Resistance 
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Abolishing these institutions should be accompanied by a 
redirection of criminal justice spending to rebuild the neighborhoods 
that they have devastated. There should be a massive infusion of 
resources to poor and low-income neighborhoods to help residents 
build local institutions, support social networks, and create social 
citizenship.125 Abolishing them will also force us to envision a 
radically different approach to crime disengaged from the racist logic 
of black enslavement and white supremacy. An abolitionist 
movement opens the possibility of creating alternatives to prison as 
the dominant means of punishment, as well as alternatives to 
criminal punishment as a dominant means of addressing social 
inequities.126 Instead of fearing “too much justice,” we should accept 
the challenge posed in McCleskey to envision a criminal justice 
system free of racial bias. 
 
 
Homepage, http://criticalresist.live.radicaldesigns.org/ (last visited Sept. 30, 
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concept from “those who called for the abolition of slavery in the 1880s.” Critical 
Resistance Homepage, http://criticalresist.live.radicaldesigns.org/article.php?id= 
51 (last visited Sept. 30, 2007). 
125. Susan B. Tucker & Eric Cadora, Ideas for an Open Society: Justice 
Reinvestment, 3 Open Society Institute 3 (Nov. 2003), at 2, available at 
http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/publications/ideas_20040106/
ideas_reinvestment.pdf. (proposing that governments redirect criminal justice 
spending toward “rebuilding the human resources and physical infrastructure—
the schools, healthcare, facilities, and public spaces—of neighborhoods devastated 
by high levels of incarceration”). 
126. Davis, supra note 47, at 107 (“[P]ositing decarceration as our 
overarching strategy, we would try to envision a continuum of alternatives to 
imprisonment—demilitarization of schools, revitalization of education at all 
levels, a health system that provides free physical and mental care to all, and a 
justice system based on reparation and reconciliation rather than retribution and 
vengeance.”). 
